The Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh: Federal Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology by Vandenbergh, Michael P.
Vanderbilt University Law School
Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
1986
The Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh: Federal
Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology
Michael P. Vandenbergh
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications
Part of the Environmental Law Commons, Health Law and Policy Commons, and the Science
and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact
mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Rutabaga That Ate Pittsburgh: Federal Regulation of Free Release Biotechnology, 72 Virginia Law Review.
1529 (1986)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/faculty-publications/1023
Citation: 72 Va. L. Rev.  1529 1986 
Content downloaded/printed from 
HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org)
Tue Aug  7 12:59:28 2012
   
Retrieved from  
Vanderbilt University’s Institutional Repository 
This work was originally published in 72 Va. L. Rev. 1529 1986; 
Copyright Virginia Law Review Association; used here with 
permission.
THE RUTABAGA THAT ATE PITTSBURGH: FEDERAL
REGULATION OF FREE RELEASE BIOTECHNOLOGY*
When the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) first approved a
field test of a bioengineered microbe,' one EPA official remarked: "We're
not expecting this to be the rutabaga that eats Pittsburgh.' 2 But regula-
tors cannot afford to be wrong. Bioengineered microbes may serve many
useful purposes, but they may also cause harm to the environment and to
human health.3 Although the risks of an accident stemming from the de-
liberate release of bioengineered microbes into the environment may be
low, the resulting damage could be substantial.
This note examines the possible consequences of two recent trends in
biotechnology-the development of bioengineered microbes for environ-
mental release and the emergence of a vigorous biotechnology indus-
try-on federal environmental regulation. These two developments have
produced regulatory confusion in an area that can ill afford uncertainty.
Biotechnology companies eager to recapture their research investments
through the commercialization of bioengineered products are pressing un-
derstaffed regulatory agencies to permit the release of microorganisms
produced by bioengineering techniques into the environment.4
This regulatory confusion is well illustrated by the conflicting treat-
ment the courts have given two virtually identical proposals for deliberate
release experiments. In 1984, federal district court Judge John Sirica en-
joined a university-sponsored field test of a bioengineered microbe that
had been approved by the National Institutes of Health (NIH).5 Within a
* The Review wishes to thank Professor Daniel R. Ortiz for his assistance in the
preparation of this note.
I Bioengineering is "the application of biological science towards technological ends such
as the production or use of chemicals or life forms for commercial or potentially commercial
uses." The Potential Environmental Consequences of Genetic Engineering: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Toxic Substances and Environmental Oversight of the Senate Comm. on
Environment and Public Works, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 42 (1984) [hereinafter Senate Hearings
on Environmental Consequences] (statement of Dr. John A. Moore, Assistant Administrator
for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, EPA). The first bioengineered life form to be approved
for testing outside the laboratory was the ice-minus bacterium, a genetically engineered mi-
croorganism designed to lower the frost temperature of certain plants. See infra note 27.
2Henderson, EPA Expected to Approve First Genetic Test, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1985, at
Al, col. 2, A26, col. 3. (quoting Steven Schatzow, director of pesticide programs, EPA).
3 See infra text accompanying notes 29-37.
4 Although bioengineering permits the development of many organisms for many uses,
this note only addresses rDNA microorganisms designed for environmental release.
5 See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753, 769 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd
1529
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year, the EPA approved essentially the same experiment' under the spon-
sorship of a private biotechnology company.7 Again the release was chal-
lenged in federal district court, but this time Judge T.F. Hogan refused to
grant an injunction.8 These inconsistent outcomes are due in large part to
inadequate regulatory guidelines.
In Part I, this note discusses the rapidly evolving science underlying
the development of bioengineered microbes and the growing biotechnol-
ogy industry it has spawned. In Part II, the note reviews the federal gov-
ernment's regulatory response to these developments. The analysis in
Part III identifies two crucial flaws in the present system of biotechnol-
ogy regulation: its uncertainty will stifle commercial development in bio-
technology, and it will not produce sufficient data to enable regulators
adequately to assess the special risks created by deliberate releases.9 After
examining governmental efforts to assess similar risks in the nuclear
power industry, the part argues that regulators of deliberate releases
should assemble a central data base of information about each release for
use in future risk assessment. In Part IV, the note recommends immedi-
ate modification of the regulatory scheme to clarify agency jurisdiction
and statutory authority, to stiffen reporting requirements, and to create a
centralized data bank. The part also suggests that the EPA adopt a long-
term strategy of incorporating research scientists into the regulatory pro-
cess, in order to keep pace with the rapidly changing science of biotech-
nology. The note concludes that limited statutory reform and a consistent
data base available to expert regulators will improve risk assessment and
enable the safe development of a vigorous biotechnology industry.
in part, vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Judge Sirica also enjoined further
NIH approval of any other deliberate release experiments pending preparation of a
"programmatic" Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) addressing the broad environmen-
tal concerns involved in authorizing deliberate release experiments, as required by §
102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)
(1982). See Foundation on Econ. Trends, 587 F. Supp. at 769; infra note 56 (discussing
NEPA's EIS requirements). This portion of the decision was reversed on appeal. See Foun-
dation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 158-60 (D.C. Cir. 1985). These decisions
are discussed in detail at infra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
6 The initial experiment involved application of ice-minus bacteria to potato plants. See
Norman, Judge Halts Gene-Splicing Experiment, 224 Sci. 962, 962 (1984). The second ex-
periment involved application of the same strain of bacteria to 2,400 strawberry plants. See
Hilts & Henderson, EPA Clears Way for Release of New Antifrost Microbe, Wash. Post,
Nov. 15, 1985, at A2, col. 5.
7The biotechnology company was Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc. See Hilts & Hender-
son, supra note 6, at A2, col. 5.
8 See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C. 1986).
9 This type of risk is described hereinafter as "low probability/high consequence" risk.
See infra note 203 and accompanying text.
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I. RECOMBINANT DNA TECHNOLOGY AND THE EMERGING BIOTECHNOLOGY
INDUSTRY
The process that spawned the biotechnology industry, known as "re-
combinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) technology,"' ° involves the in-
sertion of one or more small segments of one organism's genetic material,
or DNA, into the DNA of another organism. DNA is composed of two
strands of nucleotides arranged in a double helix." Each strand is made
up of chains of four base nucleotides that appear in varying order;12 the
order of the nucleotides determines the variability of the genetic traits
that pass from generation to generation as the organism reproduces. 3
Biotechnology uses several techniques to alter this genetic sequence of
nucleotides. The method most frequently employed uses proteins known
as "restriction enzymes"' 4 to cut the DNA of an organism at specific
points, separating certain segments of DNA from the double helix.15
10 Biotechnology has its origins in the ability of biologists to recombine or splice the ge-
netic sequence of one organism into the sequence of another organism and to have that
recombined sequence reproduced in the offspring, thus the term "recombinant DNA." See
Grobstein, The Recombinant-DNA Debate, Sci. Am., July 1977, at 24-25. A number of re-
combinant DNA processes are currently being performed, including many that use varying
amounts of human intervention in the exchange of genetic materials. As used in this note,
the term "recombinant DNA" refers to all of these processes.
11 See generally id. at 22-33 (overview of the mechanics of rDNA production).
12 DNA nucleotides include cytosine, guanine, adenine, and thymine. See id. at 24.
" See id. The nucleotides are "read" in sets of three, called "codons," by other molecules
in the cell. Each codon determines, through several intermediate steps, the position of a
specific amino acid in a protein molecule. The sequence of amino acids in turn establishes
the structure and function of the protein molecule, which, with other proteins, determines
virtually every property of the organism. The entire set of codons required to produce the
amino acid sequence of a particular protein is called a "gene." See id. at 24, 29.
Each double helix of DNA is called a "chromosome." A chromosome contains many genes.
Each organism, in turn, contains a specific number of chromosomes; this number varies
greatly from one type of organism to another. See H. Curtis, Biology 209 (3d ed. 1979). In
addition, some bacteria contain one or more "plasmids," which are circular strands of self-
replicating DNA separate from the chromosomes. See id. at 25.
Replication occurs when the twin strands of DNA separate in order to form a second
DNA double helix. Absent mutations, the original sequence will be reproduced in exactly
the same form in the new strand of DNA. Any mutations or other changes that occur when
new nucleotides join the parent DNA, however, will be reproduced in the new strand of
DNA. See id. at 24.
"1 See id. Restriction enzymes leave the DNA with "sticky ends"-ends of the DNA
strand that will readily attach to complementary segments of DNA. Because the same four
nucleotides are found in the DNA of virtually all organisms, complementary sticky ends of
the DNA of different types of organisms may join. As a result, scientists can use restriction
enzymes to clip a specific gene sequence from the DNA of one organism and insert it into a
plasmid of another organism, where the sticky ends will attach to complementary segments
of DNA. See id. at 24-25.
15 See id.
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Scientists then insert these DNA segments into another organism's DNA.
The DNA inserted in this manner permanently alters the DNA of the
second organism and is reproduced in its offspring."'
Pittsburgh-eating rutabagas notwithstanding, genetically altered mi-
crobes promise efficient solutions to environmental, medical, and agricul-
tural problems that have puzzled scientists for years. Biotechnology's
wide range of potential applications has attracted considerable commer-
cial interest. Industry laboratories are already producing and selling arti-
ficial human insulin and human growth hormone in substantial quanti-
ties,117 and large-scale commercial production of aspartame using rDNA
techniques began in 1983.18 The Office of Technology Assessment
predicts that current biotechnological techniques will soon make possible
the production of pharmaceuticals such as antibiotics and vaccines, addi-
tives, sweeteners, and other food products, and many types of industrial
chemicals. 19 The late 1980's may see sales of biotechnological products for
pollution control alone exceed six billion dollars, and annual sales of all
biotechnological products may amount to over forty billion dollars by the
year 2000.20 In light of these predictions, it is not surprising that commer-
cial investment in biotechnology has been extensive. DuPont, for exam-
ple, has invested over 150 million dollars in rDNA research facilities.
21
The industry presently contains over three hundred companies, 22 and to-
16 See id.
17 See Biotechnology Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investi-
gations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 (1984)
[hereinafter House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation] (statement of Dr. Frank E.
Young, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration). Additional products include a pro-
phylactic for bovine scours, porcine diarrhea vaccine, hepatitus B vaccine and diagnostic
monoclonal antibodies. See Hardy & Glass, Our Investment- What Is at Stake?, Issues in
Sci. & Tech., Spring 1985, at 69, 76.
18 See Henderson, Aspartame: A Sweet for 2 Biotech Firms, Washington Post, Nov. 5,
1984, § 5 (Washington Business), at 1, col. 4, 31, col. 1. Of course, there have been some
striking biotechnology company failures as well. See Armos Corp. Becomes Third Major
Biotech Casualty: Files Chapter 11, 1 Biotech. L. Rep. (Liebert) 125, 125 (Aug.-Sept. 1982).
19 See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Impacts of Applied Genetics:
Micro-Organisms, Plants, and Animals 49-132 (1981); McChesney & Adler, Biotechnology
Released from the Lab: The Environmental Regulatory Framework, 13 Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,366, 10,366 (1983).
10 See McChesney & Adler, supra note 19, at 10,366.
21 Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 57 (statement of Dr.
Alexander MacLachlan, Director, Central Research & Development Dept., E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co.).
22 Staff of Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the House Comm. on Science
and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., Report on Environmental Implications of Genetic
Engineering 28 (Comm. Print 1984) [hereinafter Staff Report]. The Staff Report concluded
that "[b]iotechnology companies are rapidly approaching the point at which they will begin
the widespread production of genetically engineered organisms for commercial purposes."
1532
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tal investment in these companies exceeds three billion dollars.2 3
Although the first commercial applications of biotechnology occurred in
the pharmaceutical industry' 4 many of the most promising products of
biotechnology are nonpharmaceutical substances that entail the environ-
mental release of rDNA microbes.25 Released microbes may enhance the
recovery of underground oil and minerals, and may be used as pesticides,
as well as for hazardous waste detoxification and other purposes.2 '6 Per-
haps the two best known examples of rDNA microbes designed for envi-
ronmental release are the ice-minus bacterium that provoked the contro-
versy in Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler" and the oil-eating
bacterium that prompted the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.
2 8
Id. at 1. Since the Staff Report was completed in February 1984, several biotechnological
products have been sold commercially. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
21 Hardy & Glass, supra note 17, at 74.
2' See Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Biotechnology: An International
Analysis 72 (1984). The pharmaceutical industry was able to commercialize biotechnology
early because initial federal funds for genetic research targeted biomedical applications, the
industry already had experience in converting basic research to commercial levels of produc-
tion, and profit margins on pharmaceutical products were high enough to enable them to
recapture research and development costs. See id.
21 See id. at 217-25; Staff Report, supra note 22, at 3.
26 See Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 24, at 217-25; Staff Report, supra
note 22, at 3.
2" 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985).
The ice-minus bacterium, an rDNA modified version of a bacterium found on many
plants, was developed by Dr. Steven Lindow of the University of California at Berkeley. See
Hirano, Ecology and Physiology of Pseudomonas Syringae, Bio/Technology, Dec. 1985, at
1073. The naturally occurring strain increases plant sensitivity to frost, causing frost to form
in plant tissue at relatively mild temperatures. See Environmental Implications of Genetic
Engineering: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight and the Sub-
comm. on Science, Research, and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technol-
ogy, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 66-67 (1983) [hereinafter House Hearing on Environmental Impli-
cations] (statement of Dr. Steven Lindow, Dept. of Plant Pathology, Univ. of Calif. at
Berkeley). The ice-minus strain, which is able to colonize on plants formerly inhabited by
the naturally occurring strain, causes frost to form on the plants only at lower than normal
temperatures. The ice-minus mutant also occurs naturally in small numbers, but can be
produced in large quantities using rDNA techniques. See id. at 67. The savings from this
lowering of the frost point in citrus fruits and other crops could range from one to three
billipn dollars per year. Staff Report, supra note 22, at 14. Sales from a commercially viable
ice-minus bacterium might reach $100 million per year. Biotechnology: Strawberry Fields
Forever, Time, Nov. 11, 1985, at 74.
28 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (upholding the patentability of genetically altered life forms).
The petroleum-consuming microbe that was the subject of controversy in Chakrabarty
has commercial potential because it can degrade the carbon compounds found in petroleum.
See id. at 305. The microbe converts petroleum sludge to several more innocuous com-
pounds. See id. Other rDNA microbes also may be able to consume pollutants like the di-
1986] 1533
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The methods used to produce rDNA microbes designed for deliberate
release are the same as those used for other rDNA microbes. Deliberate
release microbes, however, differ in one significant way: unlike most other
rDNA microbes, which die outside the laboratory29 they are designed to
survive in the environment long enough to perform a designated task. For
this reason, they present significantly greater risks than other rDNA
products.30
Moreover, microbes designed for environmental release are potentially
hazardous, because they may have acquired traits that enable them to
outcompete existing organisms in the environment, disturbing the ecolog-
ical balance of an entire area.3 1 Altered microbes released in the environ-
ment may also interact with other organisms, exchanging genetic material
and creating potentially hazardous new microbes.32 In addition, deliber-
ately released microbes may cause disease or create toxins hazardous to
plants, animals, or humans.33 Although escaped laboratory-bound mi-
crobes present many of the same dangers, the fact that deliberately re-
leased microbes are designed to survive in the environment exacerbates
these problems.
3 4
Deliberate release microbes may also pose greater risks than ordinary,
oxin found at Times Beach, Missouri. See House Hearing on Environmental Implications,
supra note 27, at 60 (statement of Dr. Ananda Chakrabarty, Dept. of Microbiology, Univ. of
Illinois Medical Center). Similar microbes may be an efficient means of degrading hazardous
wastes in landfills and dumpsites. See id. The commercial potential for these waste-consum-
ing microbes will grow as more toxic wastes are produced.
" For an explanation of why laboratory organisms die outside the laboratory, see infra
text accompanying notes 235-36. There has never been a reported incident endangering
humans or the environment with the laboratory-based research. See House Hearing on En-
vironmental Implications, supra note 27, at 38 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior
Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology Assessment). In fact, early
guidelines suggested that research be performed on organisms designed to survive only in
the laboratory. See Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed.
Reg. 27,911, 27,916 (July 7, 1976).
3' See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 38-39 (statement
of Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technol-
ogy Assessment); Korwek & de Ia Cruz, Federal Regulation of Environmental Releases of
Genetically Manipulated Microorganisms, 11 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 301, 308-09
(1985).
3' See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 20-21 (statement
of Dr. Frances Sharples, Oak Ridge National Laboratory); McChesney & Adler, supra note
19, at 10,368. This competitive edge may stem from the new microbe's lack of natural ene-
mies, or from a potentially undetectable difference in its ability to survive. See id.
32 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 15; infra text accompanying note 217.
3 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 16.
3 See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 39 (statement of
Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology
Assessment); Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 30, at 308.
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inert pollutants. Whereas non-biological pollutants do not multiply-and
often degrade into harmless substances-microbial pollutants reproduce
rapidly.3 5 Although both types of pollutants may be dispersed by wind
and water, microbes may migrate on their own.3' Released microbes thus
present unique risks to the environment and to human health.
3 7
The promise of biotechnological products is matched by the inherent
risks involved in an area that scientists are only beginning to understand.
These risks are troublesome not because they are highly probable, but
because measuring them is tremendously difficult. Establishing the likeli-
hood that an altered microbe will severely disrupt the environment-or
worse-is complex and uncertain. The confusion and inadequacy of the
federal regulatory system adds to this uncertainty.
H. FEDERAL REGULATION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY
Scientists first voiced reservations about the potential hazards of rDNA
research in 1974.18 Within two years, the general public became con-
35 See McChesney & Adler, supra note 19, at 10,368.
S See id.
3 Interestingly, although rDNA microbes may cause environmental harm, they may also
be used to reduce the environmental damage caused by pollutants like oil sludge and toxic
wastes. See Powledge, Prospects for Pollution Control with Microbes, Bio/Technology, Nov.
1983, at 743, 743; supra note 28. Thus, concerns about creating new pollution must be bal-
anced against the possibility that overall pollution levels may be reduced.
" A committee of scientists chaired by Dr. Paul Berg wrote a letter to the editors of two
leading science publications raising the issue of possible hazards from rDNA research and
advising scientists to accept a voluntary moratorium on the research until the risks could be
investigated. See Letter to the Editor, Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Mole-
cules, 185 Sci. 303 (1974); Letter to the Editor, NAS Ban on Plasmid Engineering, 250 Na-
ture 175 (1974). In addition to Dr. Berg, the letter was signed by Drs. David Baltimore,
Herbert W. Boyer, Stanley N. Cohen, Ronald W. Davis, David Hogness, Daniel Nathans,
Richard Roblin, James Watson, Sherman Weissman, and Norton D. Zinder. The letter
called for the NIH to establish a committee of experts to oversee rDNA research and re-
quested the NIH to develop guidelines for investigators working with potentially hazardous
recombinant DNA molecules. See Pendorf, Regulating the Environmental Release of Genet-
ically Engineered Organisms: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 12 Fla. St. U.L.
Rev. 891, 897-98 (1985) (explaining the background of the Paul Berg letter).
In February of 1975 the NIH, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), and the National
Science Foundation (NSF) jointly sponsored a conference for scientists involved in rDNA
research at the Asilomar Conference Center in Pacific Grove, California. See Dworkin, Sci-
ence, Society, and the Expert Town Meeting: Some Comments on Asilomar, 51 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 1471, 1472 (1978); Pendorf, supra, at 898. The scientists at Asilomar developed and
proposed guidelines to ensure the containment of rDNA organisms in the laboratory. Some
criticism was leveled at the lack of time the conference devoted to policy discussion and by
its exclusion of the press and general public. See Dworkin, supra, at 1472-78. The general
public first became concerned about the potential hazards of rDNA research as a result of
the publicity surrounding the Asilomar Conference. Scientists were uncertain of the amount
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cerned not only about possible leaks of microbes from laboratories, but
also about the ethical consequences of modifying the genetic code.39 Con-
gress responded to these concerns by holding several hearings40 and intro-
ducing at least twelve bills regarding the regulation of rDNA research.4
Despite the intense congressional interest, however, no legislation
emerged.
42
In response to the growing concern over rDNA research in the scientific
community and among the general public, the NIH, which funds most
academic rDNA research, directed its Recombinant DNA Advisory Com-
mittee (NIHRAC) to develop guidelines for rDNA research.4 In July
1976, the NIH issued its first Guidelines for Research Involving Recombi-
nant DNA Molecules (the Guidelines)." The Guidelines focused on
preventing the accidental escape of rDNA products." Five types of re-
search were considered too hazardous to be performed, including the "de-
liberate release into the environment of any organism containing a recom-
binant DNA molecule.' 46 Under the administration of NIHRAC, the
Guidelines have apparently succeeded in their mission-rDNA research
has developed rapidly without an accident seriously injuring humans or
of risk involved in the research, and many feared the worst. See Guthrie, DNA Technology:
Are We Ready?, 6 Dalhousie L.J. 659, 664-65 (1981).
"' See, e.g., Fletcher, Ethics and Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1131
(1978); Office of Technology Assessment, supra note 19, app. III-A, at 316.
40 Cf. Staff of the Subcomm. on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., Recombinant DNA Research
and Its Applications: Oversight Report (Comm. Print 1978) [hereinafter Senate Oversight
Report] (recommendations based on hearings held in Nov. 1977).
41 See Wines, Genetic Engineering-Who'll Regulate the Rapidly Growing Private Sec-
tor?, 1983 Nat'l J. 2096, 2101.
42 Congress is now considering two bills on biotechnology regulation. See infra note 142;
infra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
3 See Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 34 (statement of
Dr. Bernard Talbot, Acting Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases,
NIH). The authority to promulgate the Guidelines was derived from the Public Health Ser-
vice Act, 42 U.S.C. § 241(a)-(b) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). See McChesney & Adler, supra
note 19, at 10,370 & n.42.
44 Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,911,
27,912-14 (July 7, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Guidelines]. The Guidelines classified research on
the basis of the perceived hazards of the different types of rDNA research. Each research
classification was then assigned to be performed under a corresponding level of containment
constraining the research performed under that classification. See id. See generally Senate
Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 33-41 (statement of Dr. Bernard
Talbot, Acting Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, NIH) (dis-
cussing the evolution of the Guidelines).
45 Research was to be performed on organisms designed to die outside the laboratory. See
1976 Guidelines, supra note 44, at 27,915-17.
46 See id. at 27,914-15.
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the environment."7
The NIH has revised and relaxed the Guidelines numerous times since
their original promulgation 4 and lifted the general prohibition against
the deliberate release of rDNA microbes. 9 The relaxation of the prohibi-
tion against deliberate release experiments culminated in the NIH's ap-
proval of three such experiments, including the ice-minus release pro-
posed by Dr. Steven Lindow and initially enjoined in Foundation on
Economic Trends v. Heckler.50
A. Regulation of Deliberate Releases by Federally Funded Institu-
tions: Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler
The NIH approval of the three experiments refueled public debate over
rDNA research5l and provoked the first court challenge to the adminis-
tration of the NIH Guidelines in the context of deliberate release,
Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler.52 The plaintiffs in Founda-
47 See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 38 (statement of
Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology
Assessment).
48 See 43 Fed. Reg. 60,108 (Dec. 22, 1978); 45 Fed. Reg. 77,384 (Nov. 21, 1980); 46 Fed.
Reg. 34,462 (July 1, 1981); 47 Fed. Reg. 17,180 (Apr. 21, 1982); 47 Fed. Reg. 38,048 (Aug. 27,
1982); 48 Fed. Reg. 24,556 (June 1, 1983); 49 Fed. Reg. 46,266 (Nov. 23, 1984); 51 Fed. Reg.
16,958 (May 7, 1986).
' In 1978 the NIH revised the Guidelines' classifications of experiments and stated that
although deliberate release was still prohibited, exceptions could be granted "provided that
these experiments are expressly approved by the Director, NIH, with advice of the Recom-
binant DNA Advisory Committee after appropriate notice and opportunity for public com-
ment." Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 43 Fed. Reg.
60,108, 60,108 (Dec. 22, 1978) [hereinafter 1978 Guidelines]. Significantly, the NIH did not
prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the 1978 revision. See Foundation on
Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 149 (D.C. Cir. 1985); infra note 56 and accompanying
text. In 1982 the NIH changed the classification of deliberate release experiments from
"Prohibitions" to "Experiments that Require RAC Review and NIH and Institutional Bi-
osafety Committee Approval Before Initiation." See Guidelines for Research Involving Re-
combinant DNA Molecules, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,180, 17,186-87 (Apr. 21, 1982) [hereinafter 1982
Guidelines]; see also Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 35
(testimony of Dr. Bernard Talbot, Acting Director, National Institute of Allergy and Infec-
tious Diseases, NIH) (outlining changes made to NIH Guidelines in 1978 and 1982).
'1 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 17. Because of feasibility problems, the other two
experiments-a field test of corn plants and a field test of tobacco and tomato plants-were
never performed. See id. at 17 & n.22.
" See, e.g., Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1; House Hear-
ing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27; Staff Report, supra note 22; Begley,
Greening the Gene, Newsweek, Nov. 12, 1984, at 103, 103-04.
1, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir.
1985). For a description of the case including a listing of sources publishing case documents,
see Korwek & de la Cruz, supra note 30, at 311 n.54.
1986] 1537
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tion on Economic Trends, led by anti-biotechnology activist Jeremy
Rifkin,5 3 sought an injunction against the approval of Dr. Lindow's ice-
minus experiment" on two grounds. First, the plaintiffs maintained that
in revising the deliberate release portion of the Guidelines in 1978, 1982,
and 1983, the NIH had failed to follow the requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).55 Specifically, the plaintiffs claimed
that the NIH should have prepared a programmatic Environmental Im-
pact Statement (EIS) before modifying the Guidelines to permit the de-
liberate release of any rDNA microbes into the environment. " '
53 For descriptions of Jeremy Rifkin, a leader of the Foundation on Economic Trends, see
Marshall, The Prophet Jeremy, New Republic, Dec. 10, 1984, at 20; Chase, Jeremy Rifkin
Usually Infuriates-and Often Bests-Biotech Industry, Wall St. J., May 2, 1986, at 23, col.
4. Other plaintiffs on the first amended complaint were Michael W. Fox, Environmental
Action, Inc., and the Environmental Task Force.
The experiment involved spraying a solution containing the ice-minus bacteria on a
row of potato plants to determine whether the sprayed plants would be less susceptible to
frost damage. See Foundation on Econ. Trends, 587 F. Supp. at 755-56; Norman, supra note
6, at 962. For a description of the ice-minus bacterium, see supra note 27.
' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1982).
5 See Foundation on Econ. Trends, 587 F. Supp. at 756-57. Plaintiffs alleged that the
NIH's conduct was in violation of § 102(2)(C) of NEPA, which requires a federal agency,
before taking major action that may have a significant impact on the environment, to pre-
pare an EIS describing in detail:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
For a federal agency, the decision whether to prepare an EIS has three steps. First, the
agency must determine whether the proposed action is subject to a "categorical exclusion,"
which means that the agency need not prepare either an EIS or an Environmental Assess-
ment. See 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(2) (1985). Categorical exclusions are granted to actions that
"do not individually or cumulatively have a significant effect on the human environment."
Id. § 1508.4. If the agency determines that the activity is not excluded, it must prepare an
Environmental Assessment (EA). Id. § 1501.4(b). An EA must "[b]riefly provide sufficient
evidence and analysis for determining whether to prepare an environmental impact state-
ment or a finding of no significant impact." Id. § 1508.9(a)(1). Finally, the agency must
determine, based on the EA, whether the action will have a significant impact on the envi-
ronment; if it will, the agency must prepare an EIS. See id. § 1501.4(c). The EIS evaluation
process may be reqtdired both for a single agency action (such as approval of a specific mi-
crobial release) or for an action establishing a broad program or process (such as the
NIHRAC procedure for reviewing deliberate release experiments). The latter is known as a
"programmatic" EIS. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 159 (D.C.
Cir. 1985).
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Second, the plaintiffs maintained that the procedure used to approve
this particular deliberate release-the ice-minus experiment-did not
comply with NEPA.57 Judge John Sirica agreed and granted a prelimi-
nary injunction, pending compliance with NEPA, against both the ice-
minus experiment and future NIH approval of any other deliberate re-
lease experiments.5 Judge Sirica explicitly exempted NIH approval of
commercial deliberate release experiments, however, on the ground that
NEPA applied only to federally funded institutions.59
Scientists immediately criticized the injunction against the ice-minus
experiment 0 and predicted that it would have a "tremendous chilling ef-
fect" on research." The exemption for commercial research was described
as a "gaping loophole"' that created a "double standard."8 3 One com-
mentator even suggested that the exemption for commercial research
would induce a "drain of scientists from the universities into industry or
out of the country."'"
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit upheld the injunction against the ice-minus experiment
but vacated the injunction against future NIH approval of any other de-
liberate releases as overly broad. 5 In upholding the ice-minus injunction,
the District of Columbia Circuit found the NIH's review of the possible
environmental consequences of the experiment insufficient to satisfy the
requirements of NEPA. 8 Finding, among other problems, that the NIH
67 See Foundation on Econ. Trends, 587 F. Supp. at 767.
58 See id. at 769.
5, See id. at 766-67.
60 See Norman, supra note 6, at 962.
61 Id. (quoting Daniel Adams, president of Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc.).
62 Id.
63 Id. at 963.
" Id. at 962 (quoting Daniel Adams, president of Advanced Genetic Sciences, Inc.). For a
review of the impact of the emerging biotechnology industry on the academic community
and the potential "brain drain," see Congressional Research Service, Biotechnology:. Com-
mercialization of Academic Research 5 (Issue Brief ]B81160) (prepared by J. Johnson) (rev.
May 17, 1983).
65 See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 160 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
88 See id. at 154. NEPA requires federal agencies to determine whether an EIS is required
by performing a preliminary assessment of possible environmental consequences. See supra
note 56. The Court of Appeals noted that the NIH had prepared an EIS shortly after it
promulgated the Guidelines, but due to the ban on deliberate releases, the EIS did not
contemplate the potential environmental hazards of deliberate release experiments. See
Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 148 (D.C.Cir. 1985). The EIS did
state that in the event of unintentional environmental release of "organisms containing
recombined DNA ... into the environment, they might, depending on their fitness relative
to naturally occuring [sic] organisms, find a suitable ecological niche for their own reproduc-
tion. A potentially dangerous organism might then multiply and spread." Id. No EIS mea-
suring the effects of the ice-minus experiment was prepared.
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had not considered the environmental effects of the microbe's disper-
sion, 6  the court stated that "[ignoring possible environmental conse-
quences will not suffice. Nor will a mere conclusory statement that the
number of recombinant-DNA-containing organisms will be small and sub-




In regard to the injunction against future approval of deliberate release
experiments, the court noted that development of a new technology with
unknown consequences was precisely the type of governmental action
that typically required programmatic review. 9 It concluded, however,
that NEPA did not require the NIH to prepare a programmatic EIS
before beginning to consider applications for approval of deliberate re-
lease experiments.70 Instead, the court found it sufficient that the NIH
engage in rigorous case-by-case examination of the environmental conse-
quences of each deliberate release proposal.
7 1
In a concurring opinion, Judge MacKinnon asserted that the experi-
ment presented minimal risks, but that the NIH should have performed
the proper assessments of environmental consequences to address "lay
concerns" with the new technology.72 He then criticized the Foundation
on Economic Trends for failing to object to the approval of deliberate
release experiments during the NIH review process. 73 Thus, although the
court reaffirmed the NIH's regulatory authority under NEPA, it also rec-
ognized that protracted litigation could damage rDNA research.
A significant jurisdictional question remained. The development of the
NIH Guidelines had inadvertently created a double standard:74 whereas
scientists conducting rDNA research in facilities receiving federal funds
were required to comply with the Guidelines, 75 those in private nonprofit
laboratories and commercial enterprises were not.76 Although Foundation
" See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 153 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
" Id. at 154.
69 See id. at 159 ("[Flederal development of a new technology with unknown environmen-
tal consequences is the type of action in which programmatic considerations are particularly
important.").
70 Id. The court suggested, however, that a programmatic EIS might be required at a later
date, when requests for approval of deliberate releases became more frequent. See id. at
159-60.
" See id. at 159.
72 Id. at 161 (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
73 See id.
71 See Norman, supra note 6, at 963.
71 Guidelines for Research Involving Recombinant DNA Molecules, 48 Fed. Reg. 24,556,
24,563 (June 1, 1983) [hereinafter 1983 Guidelines]. The maximum penalty for violating the
Guidelines is withdrawal of NIH funds. Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences,
supra note 1, at 37 (statement of Dr. Bernard Talbot, Acting Director, National Institute of
Allergy and Infectious Diseases, NIH).
70 See 1983 Guidelines, supra note 75, at 24,563. These scientists are, however, encouraged
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on Economic Trends forced the NIH to assess the environmental hazards
of deliberate release experiments by federally funded institutions, the
regulation of commercial enterprises was left up to other federal agencies.
B. Regulation of Commercial Deliberate Releases
Soon after the commercialization of biotechnology began, academic
scientists and members of the biotechnology industry recognized the need
for greater coordination among the federal regulatory agencies sharing re-
sponsibility for rDNA.7" Uncertain of the regulatory picture, biotechnol-
ogy companies viewed jurisdictional disputes among agencies with suspi-
cion78 and were less eager to invest in product development.79
To address these problems, the Cabinet Council on Natural Resources
and the Environment formed the Working Group on Biotechnology "to
determine whether the existing regulatory apparatus was adequate to
consider the safety and health and environmental effects of modern bio-
technology as its products and processes move from contained research
laboratories to the marketplace."80 The Working Group reviewed federal
biotechnology regulation and published a proposed regulatory strategy in
December 198481 and a revised proposal in November 1985.82 Seven
months later, the Working Group published for public comment the final
regulatory proposal, entitled "Coordinated Framework for Regulation of
to comply with the Guidelines voluntarily. See id.
7 See Sun, Biotechnology's Regulatory Tangle, 225 Sci. 697, 697 (1984); Hilts, Panel Cre-
ated to Coordinate Biotechnology Policy, Wash. Post, Nov. 12, 1985, at A6, col. 1.
79 See Rhein & Hall, Splicing Together a Regulatory Body for Biotechnology, Bus. Wk.,
Jan. 14, 1985, at 69, 69.
71 See Biotechnology Development: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and In-
vestigation of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 70 (1985)
(testimony of Robert B. Nicholas, Partner, Blum, Nash & Railsback, Wash., D.C.).
60 House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 11 (testimony of Dr.
Bernadine Bulkley, Deputy Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive
Office of the President). The group was composed of representatives of 15 agencies. See
Sun, supra note 77, at 697. Among the agencies were the EPA, the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA), the Department of Agriculture (USDA), and the Office of Science and Tech-
nology Policy (OSTP), which was formed in April of 1984. See House Hearing on Biotech-
nology Regulation, supra note 17, at 68 (memorandum of Martin L. Smith, Deputy
Assistant Director for Energy and Natural Resources, Office of Policy Development, Execu-
tive Office of the President). The name of the Working Group has since been changed to the
Domestic Policy Council Working Group, and it is now chaired by the OSTP Director. See
Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology: Establishment of the Biotechnol-'
ogy Science Coordinating Committee, 50 Fed. Reg. 47,174, 47,175 (proposed Nov. 14, 1985)
[hereinafter 1985 Coordinated Framework].
81 Proposal for a Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 49 Fed. Reg.
50,856 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Coordinated Framework].
82 1985 Coordinated Framework, supra note 80, at 47,174.
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Biotechnology" (the Coordinated Framework).8 3
To enhance agency cooperation, the Coordinated Framework estab-
lishes a two-tiered mechanism. As initially proposed, the lower tier con-
sisted of an rDNA science advisory committee in each affected federal
agency" and the upper tier of a science advisory committee, called the
Biotechnology Science Board (BSB), which had substantial power to en-
sure interagency cooperation and consistency through its review of regula-
tory procedures in the individual agencies.85 When the double-review pro-
cess was attacked as cumbersome and unnecessary,86 the Working Group
responded by stripping the BSB of most of its supervisory powers, re-
marking somewhat ironically that it believed "interagency information
sharing and coordination could be [more] effectively carried out by a
structure offering interagency coordination.
'8 7
In its final form, the Biotechnology Science Coordinating Committee
(BSOC), as the Biotechnology Science Board is now called, consists of
representatives from NIH, the EPA, the National Science Foundation,
the Food and Drug Administration and the Department of Agriculture.
The BSCC has four functions: to coordinate scientific information sharing
and problem solving; to promote the development of consistent review
procedures and assessment techniques by affected agencies; to foster
agency cooperation on new scientific issues; and to identify important
gaps in scientific understanding of rDNA. 8 In short, the BSCC does not
oversee the individual agencies, but operates solely in an advisory capac-
ity." Whether the "watered down" BSCC will have the authority to coor-
83 51 Fed. Reg. 23,302 (June 26, 1986) (as corrected by 51 Fed. Reg. 25,412 (July 14,
1986)) [hereinafter 1986 Coordinated Framework]. The 1986 Coordinated Framework em-
phasizes the need to minimize regulation to enable the American biotechnology industry to
compete successfully with growing international competition. See id. at 23,308.
See 1985 Coordinated Framework, supra note 80, at 47,175.
'5 See id.
88 See Hilts, supra note 77, at A6, col. 1 (noting that industry representatives feared that
a review board would add an additional hurdle to the regulatory process).
87 1985 Coordinated Framework, supra note 80, at 47,175.
88 See id. The final proposal adopts the BSCC structure set forth in the 1985 Coordinated
Framework. See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 83, at 23,306.
89 See 1985 Coordinated Framework, supra note 80, at 47,176. The BSCC has been
formed as a committee of the Federal Coordinating Council for Science, Engineering, and
Technology, a little known interagency coordinating council of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President. The BSCC will be chaired on a rotat-
ing basis by the Assistant Director for Biological, Behavioral and Social Sciences of the NSF
and the Director of the NIH. See id.
90 See Hilts, supra note 77, at A6, col. 1 (reporting comment of David T. Kingsbury, As-
sistant Director for Biological, Behavioral and Social Sciences for the National Science
Foundation, that "[w]e are not going to spend our time looking over agency shoulders and
saying 'You made a mistake in releasing something, and we'll have to bring it back' ").
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dinate federal biotechnology regulation effectively is doubtful.9 '
To accompany the Coordinated Framework, the EPA prepared an
agency policy statement (Microbial Product Policy).2 In the Microbial
Product Policy, the EPA has asserted its authority to serve as the princi-
pal regulatory agency for the deliberate release of rDNA microbes.9 3 At
the same time, the EPA has relinquished authority over genetically engi-
neered plants and animals.94 Under the Microbial Product Policy, the
EPA will regulate commercial production of rDNA microbes under two
principal statutes: the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA)"5 and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA)9
1. Statutory Regulation Under FIFRA
FIEFRA is the principal statute governing the testing, distribution, and
use of pesticides.9 7 Because many releases of rDNA microbes will involve
pesticides, FIFRA will play a major role in the regulation of the biotech-
nology industry.9 8 Under FIFRA, the EPA cannot authorize the sale or
distribution of a pesticide or other regulated substance until it collects
sufficient data to ensure that "when used in accordance with widespread
and commonly recognized practice, [it] will not cause (or significantly in-
crease the risk of) unreasonable adverse effects to humans or the environ-
ment."9 9 The EPA has regulated naturally occurring microbial pesticides
for years;'0 0 by 1985, fourteen microbial pesticides were registered under
FIFRA requirements.20 Under the Microbial Product Policy, the EPA
91 See Sun, EPA Approves Field Test of Altered Microbes, 230 Sci. 1015, 1016 (1985).
" Statement of Policy: Microbial Products Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act and the Toxic Substances Control Act, 51 Fed. Reg. 23,313 (June 26,
1986) [hereinafter 1986 Microbial Product Policy]. Earlier proposals were published at 49
Fed. Reg. 50,880 (proposed Dec. 31, 1984) [hereinafter 1984 Microbial Product Policy], and
49 Fed. Reg. 40,659 (proposed Oct. 17, 1984) [hereinafter Interim Microbial Product Policy].
9$ The assertion was made initially by the 1984 proposed policy and has been carried out
in the final policy as well. Both policy statements have, however, recognized the overlapping
jurisdiction of other federal agencies. See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at
50,895; 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,318.
" See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,318. The EPA has explained
that it must strike "a balance between the restrictions and higher costs" of regulation. 1984
Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,882.
7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1982, Supp. I 1983, Supp. II 1984, Supp. III 1985).
-6 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1982, Supp. I 1983, Supp. II 1984, Supp. III 1985).
97 See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,882.
98 See generally 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,319-24 (discussing
the applicability of FIFRA to microbial products).
9 Id. at 23,319; see 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(5)(D), (c)(7) (1982); 40 C.F.R. § 162.2(d)(4) (1986).
"0 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320.
101 Id.
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will extend FIFRA to genetically engineered microorganisms"0 2 that are
considered to be "pesticides" under FIFRA section 2(u).
103
The EPA's registration requirements and testing procedures for non-
rDNA microbial pesticides are designed to enable the agency to evaluate
the risks of "infectivity, pathogenicity, toxicity, host range, virulence, and
survivability.""1 4 RDNA microbial pesticides present many of the same
risks as their non-rDNA counterparts, but may have greater survivability,
enhanced virulence, and greater ability to compete with indigenous
organisms.10 5 In response to these risks, the EPA will apply the current
microbial pesticide regulations to rDNA microbes,'0 6 but may require
more detailed data for use in assessing the risks of particular rDNA mi-
crobial pesticides.
1 7
The EPA requires producers of new non-rDNA pesticides to submit
data sufficient to indicate the identity, molecular composition, potential
harmful effects, and environmental fate of the pesticide. 08 For rDNA
pesticides, the EPA may require certain additional data, including infor-
mation on the specific gene sequence inserted in the microbe, the method
used to insert that sequence, the regions in the gene that control its ex-
pression, the new traits that it expresses, and the likelihood that the gene
will be transferred to other organisms in nature. 0 9
After an applicant has submitted the required data for the new pesti-
102 See id. at 23,319-20.
1o3 See id. at 23,319-24. Section 2(u) of FIFRA defines "pesticide" as "(1) any substance
or mixture of substances intended for preventing, destroying, repelling, or mitigating any
pest, and (2) any substance or mixture of substances intended for use as a plant regulator,
defoliant, or dessicant." 7 U.S.C. § 136(u) (1982); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 162.3 (ff), 162.4 (1986).
Most nonmicrobial organisms considered to be biological control agents, on the other hand,
are currently exempt from FIFRA because they are regulated by other agencies. See 1986
Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320; 40 C.F.R. § 162.5(c)(4) (1986). The EPA
defines "biological control agent" as "any living organism applied to or introduced into the
environment to control the population or biological activities of another life form which is
considered a pest under section 2(t) of FIFRA." Id. § 162.5(c)(2).
104 See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,884.
105 See id.
100 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,319-24.
10 See id. at 23,321, 23,323.
108 See 40 C.F.R. § 158.170 (1986). Specific data requirements vary depending upon the
"general use patterns" of the pesticide. The uses are grouped into six categories: "terrestial,
aquatic, greenhouse, forestry, domestic outdoor, or indoor." Id. Depending upon the general
use pattern, data are required in four categories. First, data are required regarding product
analysis to determine the identity of the pesticide and possible formation of unintentional
by-products. Second, residue data are required to determine the amount and type of com-
pounds that remain after application of the pesticide. Third, toxicology data are required to
identify possible toxicity. Fourth, "non-target organism and environmental expression" data
are required to assess the impact of the pesticide on the environment. See id.
109 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,321, 23,323.
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cide, the EPA may then regulate its use under FIFRA." 0 Section 5 of
FIFRA allows an individual to obtain an Experimental Use Permit (EUP)
for limited uses of an unregistered pesticide."" The EUP allows an appli-
cant to bypass the lengthy delays and expense of registration in the early
development of a pesticide. Small-scale field testing of a pesticide may be
conducted without even an EUP, however, so long as the principal pur-
pose of the test is to establish the pesticide's effectiveness, rather than to
provide actual pest control." 2
The EPA has recognized that microbial pesticides have several charac-
teristics that may make even small-scale field tests of such pesticides
quite dangerous: replication, dispersion, and resistance to "natural con-
trol."113 As a result, the EPA requires individuals to notify it before con-
ducting any field studies, regardless of size or purpose, with microbial
pesticides." 4 This notification process is designed to enhance the EPA's
110 The EPA will follow the same procedures for registering rDNA pesticides as those
used in registering chemical pesticides and non-rDNA microbial pesticides. See id. at 23,321.
These procedures are codified at 40 C.F.R. §§ 152 and 158 (1986). The expected time re-
quired for EPA review of submitted data under FIFRA currently varies from nine months
to several years, and similar periods may be expected for rDNA microbial pesticides. See
1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,885. Once registered, microbial pesti-
cides are regulated under 40 C.F.R. §§ 158.65 and 158.170 (1986).
" See 7 U.S.C. § 136c (1982). 40 C.F.R. § 172 (1986) establishes the procedures for issu-
ance of EUPs.
"I See 40 C.F.R. § 172.3 (1986). The exemption from EUP requirements applies only to
field studies of not more than 10 acres if on land or one surface-acre if on water. See id. §
172.3(a)(1)-(2).
"1 See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,885. "Microbial pesticides...
may replicate and spread beyond the site of application. Further, nonindigenous and geneti-
cally engineered microbial pesticides may not be subject to natural control or dissipation
mechanisms; they may be capable of spreading beyond the site of application . . . ." Id.
"' See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320. The amount of informa-
tion that the notice must include varies depending on how risky the EPA believes the mi-
croorganism to be. Level II microbes, which are considered more dangerous, include
"[m]icrobial pesticides formed by deliberately combining genetic material from organisms of
different genera, genetically engineered microbial pesticides derived from source organisms
that are pathogens . . . and nonindigenous pathogenic microbial pesticides." Id. at 23,321.
These microbes are subject to stringent reporting requirements. Level I microbes, for which
less information must be submitted, include all other microbial pesticides. Information that
must be submitted for Level I microbes is as follows:
(1) Identity of the microorganism, including characteristics, and means and limits of
detection.
(2) Description of the natural habitat of the microorganism or its parental strains,
including information on natural predators, parasites, and competitors.
(3) Information on the host range of the parental strain(s) or nonindigenous
microorganism.
(4) Information on the relative environmental competitiveness of the microorganism,
if available.
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ability to restrict small-scale field tests of potentially hazardous microbes.
2. Statutory Regulation Under TSCA
The EPA will regulate non-pesticidal commercial microbes, DNA se-
quences, and their products under TSCA. The purpose of TSCA is "to
provide a comprehensive mechanism for addressing the hazards to health
and the environment of chemical substances." 115 Section 3(2) of TSCA
defines "chemical substance" as "any organic or inorganic substance of a
particular molecular identity, including ... (i) any combination of such
substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction
or occurring in nature and (ii) any element or uncombined radical." 116
The definition specifically excludes mixtures, pesticides, tobacco and to-
bacco products, nuclear materials, and food, drug, or cosmetic devices."
7
The EPA will regulate most non-pesticidal rDNA gene sequences and mi-
crobes through TSCA, on the basis of their purported status as new
chemical substances." 8 According to the EPA, the chemical substances
definition applies to these microbes because "[a] living organism is a
'combination of such substances occuring [sic] in whole or in part as a
result of a chemical reaction . . .or occurring in nature,' ""9 and DNA
(5) If the microorganism is genetically engineered, information should be provided on
the methods used to genetically engineer the microoranism(s); the identity and loca-
tion of the rearranged or inserted/deleted gene segment(s) in question; a description
of the new trait(s) or characteristic(s) that are expressed; information on potential for
genetic transfer and exchange with other organisms, and on genetic stability of any
inserted sequence.
(6) A description of the proposed testing program, including site location, crop to be
treated, target pest, amount of test material to be applied, and method of application.
Id. The information required for Level II microbes is similar to that required for Level I
microbes, but includes additional data about the location and parameters of the field test, as
well as detailed data about any genetic alterations. See id. at 23,321-22.
115 Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 122 (testimony of
Prof. Thomas 0. McGarity, Univ. of Texas Law School); see 15 U.S.C. § 2601(a)-(c) (1982).
Ile 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1982).
17 Id. § 2602(2)(B).
"1 See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,886. This approach was reaf-
firmed in the final policy. See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,324. Ac-
cording to the EPA, most microorganisms produced for environmental, industrial, or con-
sumer uses, including those that may be developed for "conversion of biomass for energy,
pollutant degradation, enhanced oil recovery, metal extraction and concentration, and cer-
tain non-food and non-pesticidal agricultural applications," are potentially regulable under
TSCA. See id. Specifically excluded from the scope of the statutue, however, are foods, food
additives, drugs, cosmetics, medical devices, and pesticides, as well as plants and animals.
See id.
119 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,886.
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sequences are "organic substances of a particular molecular identity."120
The EPA will regulate two types of microbes under TSCA-those that
have been modified by the insertion of genetic material from organisms of
different genera,' 2' and those that are pathogenic or have received genetic
material from organisms that are pathogens.' 22 The former will be regu-
lated by the premanufacture notification (PMN) requirements of TSCA
section 5(a)(1)(A);123 the latter by the significant new use report (SNUR)
requirements of TSCA section 5(a)(1)(B), whenever they are released into
the environment.
124
TSCA provides the EPA administrator with power to require a
premanufacture notification to EPA of the importation or manufacture of
any chemical defined as a "new chemical substance.' 2 5 "New" chemical
substances are those that are not listed on the current EPA Inventory of
all chemical substances currently being manufactured or processed in the
United States. 2  The EPA considers all microorganisms deliberately
formed to contain genetic material from different genera, except for those
in which the added genetic material consists only of well-characterized,
non-coding regulatory regions, to be new chemical substances subject to
the PMN reporting requirements. 27 Once a microbe has been classified
as a new chemical substance, section 5(a)(1)(A) requires commercial man-
ufacturers to notify the EPA of their intention to import or produce it
ninety days before beginning to do so. 128 The PMN must include a wide
variety of known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
120 Id.
'"l See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,325. These microbes are called
"inter-generic combinations." See id. at 23,332. The process for determining whether an
organism is an inter-generic combination is outlined in id. at 23,332-33.
1 2 See id. at 23,325. The process for determining whether an organism is pathogenic is
outlined in id. at 23,333-35.
"I See id. at 23,325.
M2 See id. ("Microorganisms other than inter-generic compounds that are. . . pathogenic
or contain genetic material from pathogens will, in the future, if released into the environ-
ment, be subject to significant new use reporting requirements under TSCA section
5(a)(2).").
,21 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(A) (1982).
", See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(9) (1982). TSCA directs the EPA to prepare and maintain a
Chemical Substances Inventory. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (1982). This Inventory contains
both manmade and naturally occurring substances. See 40 C.F.R. § 710.4(b) (1986).
11 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,325-26. The EPA has ex-
pressly reserved judgment, however, on whether microorganisms containing genetic material
from other organisms in the same genus, called "intra-generic combinations," and those that
are developed from a single source microorganism, should also be considered "new" and
therefore subject to PMN requirements. See id. at 23,325.
" See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(A) (1982).
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substance. 129
The EPA recognized that organisms and compounds that do not fall
within the statutory definition of new chemical substance-and thus
within the PMN reporting requirements-may also present significant
risks to health or the environment. 30 The Microbial Product Policy sug-
gests that the SNUR provisions of TSCA section 5 may be used, as a
supplement to the PMN requirements, to require notification to the EPA
in these cases.'"' Section 5(a)(2) authorizes the EPA, upon consideration
of all relevant factors, to issue a rule declaring that a particular use of a
chemical substance already listed on the Inventory is a "significant new
use."' 3 2 Once the EPA has issued a SNUR, section 5(a)(1)(B) requires
any individual planning to manufacture or process the substance for that
use to notify the EPA ninety days before doing so, through a submission
similar to a PMN.'33
TSCA section 5(h)(3), however, provides a significant exemption from
the PMN and SNUR requirements for chemical substances produced in
small quantities solely for research and development purposes. 3 4 "Small
quantities" have been defined by rule to be those not greater than reason-
ably necessary for research and development purposes.13  Notification is
not required under TSCA for deliberate release experiments meeting this
definition, although the EPA can require data submissions where neces-
sary."" The small quantities exemption created a much-discussed gap in
the federal oversight of deliberate release microbes: whereas academic re-
search-that is, research undertaken with the support of federal
funds-required NIH approval, 37 the same research, if performed on a
129 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(d)(1) (1982); 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2) (1982). Data include the
common name and molecular identity of the chemical substance, amount to be produced,
any test data on the effect the substance has on human health and the environment, and
other information. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607(a)(2) (1982). Implementing rules, to be codified at
40 C.F.R. § 720, were proposed in early 1983, see 48 Fed. Reg. 21,722 (May 13, 1983), and
revised a few months later, see 48 Fed. Reg. 41,132 (Sept. 13, 1983). The EPA revised these
regulations still further in the 1986 Microbial Product Policy. See infra note 190.
130 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,329.
13' See id. at 23,328-29.
132 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(2) (1982). The process for determining if a use is a significant
new use is outlined in the 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,329-30.
131 See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a)(1)(B) (1982).
13, See 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3) (1982).
" 5 See 40 C.F.R. § 720.3(cc) (1986).
':' The specific provisions of the small quantity exemption, 40 C.F.R. §§ 720.36, 720.78(b)
(1986), are currently subject to agency stay. See 48 Fed. Reg. 41,132 (1983). In the interim,
producers of small quantities must follow the general provisions of 15 U.S.C. § 2604(h)(3)
(1982) and 40 C.F.R. § 710.2(y) (1986). See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at
50,891.
"37 See supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
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small scale by commercial enterprises, was exempt from both NIHRAC
review and from TSCA's PMN requirements. 38
The 1986 Microbial Product Policy fills this gap by a rulemaking that
excludes from the small quantities exemption living microbes released
into the environment.3 " Thus, biotechnology companies planning to re-
lease rDNA microbes into the environment will be required to submit
substantial data before performing any field tests. Although this rule will
close the commercial deliberate release gap, it will narrow the statutory
definition of "small quantity" to "no quantity" in the case of deliberate
release microbes. This rule is of dubious validity and likely to provoke
litigation by the affected companies. 4 0
In sum, the Coordinated Framework and the EPA's Microbial Product
Policy comprise a complex attempt to sort out the "labyrinth"'' of fed-
eral biotechnology regulation using existing statutes. The proposals also
represent an attempt on the part of the federal government to strike a
balance between promoting the biotechnology industry and protecting
human health and the environment.
III. CRITICISMS OF THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The underlying difficulty with the present system of biotechnology reg-
ulation is that biotechnology involves new processes that in many cases
cannot be adequately dealt with by existing environmental statutes. 4' In
3 See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,891.
,39 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,330 ("Because of their ability
to reproduce and therefore increase beyond the amount originally released, living microorga-
nisms used in the environment cannot be considered to meet the commonly understood
meaning of 'small quantities' for research and development, and thus do not qualify for the
exemption.").
140 A second problem exists. Because TSCA § 5(i) defines manufacturing and processing
to mean "manufacturing or processing for commercial purposes," 15 U.S.C. § 2604(i) (1982),
pure academic research conducted without federal funds would remain outside the regula-
tory purview of the NIH Guidelines and of the EPA under TSCA. See 1984 Microbial Prod-
uct Policy, supra note 92, at 50,881; see also 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92,
at 23,331 (discussing the exemption for noncommercial research and development).
"I See Flaherty, A Brave New World for Biotech Lawyers, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 8, 1984, at 27,
col. 1.
142 Legislation designed to remedy some of the problems identified here has been intro-
duced and is pending in both houses of Congress. On December 17, 1985, Sen. Durenberger
(R-Minn.) and Sen. Baucus (D-Mont.) submitted S. 1967, entitled "A Bill to amend the
Toxic Substances Control Act to protect the environment and human health from adverse
effects caused by the release of genetically engineered micro-organisms into the environ-
ment, to promote the safe use of genetically-engineered micro-organisms, and for other pur-
poses." S. 1967, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. 17, 812-14 (1985). On March 19, 1986,
Rep. Don Fuqua (D-Fla.) introduced H.R. 4452, entitled "The Biotechnology Science Coor-
dination Act of 1986." H.R. 4452, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. 1433 (1986). For a
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the absence of legislation specifically addressing biotechnology, however,
agencies that have traditionally regulated similar activities have been
tempted to extend their authority to biotechnology. Yet prior regulation
of similar products or industries does not necessarily mean an agency has
the ability to handle the complex problems associated with biotechnology.
Although the potential risks of biotechnology resemble those addressed
by existing environmental statutes, they are often more difficult to assess.
Existing statutes may suffice in some cases, forestalling the need for new
and potentially misguided legislation. But when questionable statutory
interpretations are required to extend the reach of existing legislation, the
inevitable court challenges-and the regulatory readjustments that fol-
low-may stymie commercial development in an industry that relies upon
constant innovation and clear guidelines.
A. Regulatory Uncertainty
1. Jurisdictional Confusion
The Coordinated Framework was developed to coordinate the federal
oversight of biotechnology and to close regulatory gaps. Nevertheless, one
commentator has called the federal agencies' attempts to divide responsi-
bilities "a patchwork of conflicting regulatory policies. ' "4 3 The idea of the
BSCC was to untangle jurisdictional problems, but to prevent the addi-
tion of a time-consuming layer in the regulatory process, the current Co-
ordinated Framework gives the BSCC limited powers and membership,
which severely restricts its ability to accomplish its mission. In fact, Sena-
tor Albert Gore (D-Tenn) has stated that "the council is toothless and
just a kind of discussion group.' 1 4 4 Although an actual evaluation of the
success of the BSCC will require some experience with its operation, the
chances of the BSCC operating effectively do not appear good.14 5 Without
some assurance of order in the regulatory structure, the strength of the
biotechnology industry will be impaired.
4 6
NIHRAC and the NIH Guidelines have been extremely successful in
discussion of the provisions of both bills, see infra notes 220-34 and accompanying text.
143 Pendorf, supra note 38, at 921.
144 Sun, supra note 91, at 1016.
M Harvey Price, director of the Industrial Biotechnology Association, believes that
neither the BSCC nor its parent committee resolves the confusion about jurisdictional con-
trol. See id.
148 See Hilts, supra note 77, at A6, col. 1 (reporting that companies are uncertain about
which agency to go to for approval); Comments on Cabinet Gene-Splice Plan, 127 Sci. News,
May 4, 1985, at 280 (reporting statement of Jack Doyle, staff member of the Environmental
Policy Institute, that there is "an increasing sense of confused responsibility in the federal
establishment").
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promoting academic research while allaying public fears about rDNA
techniques, but because the Guidelines are not compulsory for commer-
cial enterprises, a resurgence of public concern is occurring. Until 1985 no
companies were prepared to perform deliberate release field tests of
rDNA products. 147 In 1985, however, a private corporation-Advanced
Genetic Sciences, Inc. (AGS)-sought and obtained EPA approval for the
release of the ice-minus bacteria developed by Dr. Lindow.24 8 Although
the NIHRAC's approval of the release sponsored by Dr. Lindow was en-
joined by a federal district court, 49 AGS, which as a private enterprise
was not required to gain NIHRAC approval, was not affected by the in-
junction. Instead, it applied for and was granted EPA permission to field
test the ice-minus bacteria,150 triggering a second suit by the Foundation
on Economic Trends.151
Months before the EPA approved the field test, AGS had performed its
own unauthorized test, injecting the bacteria into trees growing on the
two-acre roof of its Oakland, California headquarters. 52 Although AGS
contended that the experiment was "contained" and therefore safe, the
EPA later discovered that "a substantial number of the more than 45
trees leaked sap where the syringe was inserted,"'53 possibly permitting
insects and birds to carry the bacteria beyond the roof and disproving the
claim of containment. In addition, three trees developed cankers, indicat-
ing "an adverse reaction to the microbe,"'154 a reaction that AGS failed to
report to the EPA.15 5 When it learned of the unauthorized test, the EPA
", See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320; see also Karny, Regula-
tion of Genetic Engineering: Less Concern About Frankensteins but Time for Action on
Commercial Production, 12 U. Tol. L. Rev. 815, 831 (1981) (discussing why companies might
voluntarily adhere to the Guidelines).
140 See Boffey, Field Test of Gene-Altered Bacteria Is Approved, N.Y. Times, Nov. 15,
1985, at A17, col. 1.
"1 Foundation for Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984), aff'd in part,
vacated in part, 756 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1985); see supra notes 51-76 and accompanying text.
,50 See Boffey, supra note 148, at A17, col. 1.
151 Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Thomas, 637 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1986). The court
rejected a motion for a preliminary injunction against EPA approval of the experiment on
the ground that the Foundation on Economic Trends was not likely to be able to establish
that the EPA failed to follow the procedural requirements of FIFRA and NEPA or that the
EPA failed to consider adequately the risks of the field test. See id. at 28-29. The court
declined to grant summary judgment for the EPA, however, because the EPA was investi-
gating allegations of wrongdoing by AGS, and the EPA's possible revocation of the permit
"would moot any decision as to the permit's propriety." See id. at 29.
152 See Hilts, Test of Altered Microbe Was Illegal, EPA Says, Wash. Post, Feb. 27, 1986,
at A3, col. 5.
'53 See id.
'4 See id.
155 See A Novel Strain of Recklessness, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1986, at E22, col. 1.
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responded by fining the company and withdrawing its permit to test the
microbe.156
The absence of a clear federal regulatory policy and the perceived inad-
equacy of the existing policy has provoked not only an unauthorized test
and lawsuits, but also state and local governmental actions to prevent
rDNA microbial research and testing. For example, despite the lengthy
NIH and EPA review and two court challenges of the ice-minus field test,
the Monterey County, California, Board of Supervisors halted the field
test sponsored by AGS in February 1986.157 Many other local govern-
ments have passed restrictions on various forms of laboratory-based
rDNA research.'"8 In addition, the New Jersey legislature is considering a
bill that would regulate biotechnology releases. 15 9 Given the growing pub-
lic fear of rDNA deliberate releases, localities may produce even more
extensive regulations in the future. State and local regulation will com-
pound the time and expense required by biotechnology companies to gain
approval for deliberate releases, with questionable environmental bene-
fits. As these developments demonstrate, the Coordinated Framework
and the NIH Guidelines alone are insufficient to allay the public concern
about whether future deliberate releases by biotechnology companies will
be adequately regulated.18 0
158 See id.
6 See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 639 F. Supp. 25, 29 (D.D.C. 1986); How-
ard, Halting Designer Bacteria, Newsweek, Feb. 10, 1986, at 8. Several commentators have
suggested that the tort system may provide the necessary incentive for companies to adhere
to the Guidelines. See, e.g., Dworkin, Biocatastrophe and the Law: Legal Aspects of Recom-
binant DNA Research, in The Recombinant DNA Debate 222 (D. Jackson & S. Stich eds.
1979). These commentators assume that a court would find that the Guidelines establish the
standard of care for biotechnological research and production. The Guidelines have become
the customary practice in, commercial biotechnology laboratories and compliance is
mandatory for federally funded laboratories. See supra notes 51-77 and accompanying text.
Although deliberate releases were once prohibited by the Guidelines, because the Guidelines
have never been enforced against private industry, the standard of care in the event of a
deliberate release mishap is uncertain.
158 See generally Legislation-Recombinant DNA-Local Laws, 2 Biotech. L. Rep. (Lieb-
ert) 19 (Jan. 1983) (charting local laws).
'9 S. 1123, (prefiled for introduction in 202d Leg., 2d Annual Sess., 1986) (copy on file
with Virginia Law Review Association).
160 A second problem with NIH regulation of commercial rDNA activities is the tradi-
tional role of the NIH. The NIH is charged with identifying and promoting beneficial re-
search, a role that is inconsistent with the regulation of commercial biotechnology. See infra
notes 206-10 and accompanying text for a description of similar problems within the nuclear
power industry; see also Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at
116 (testimony of Prof. Thomas 0. McGarity, Univ. of Texas Law School) (comparing nu-
clear power to biotechnology promotion).
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2. The Applicability of TSCA
The EPA monitors at least fourteen microbial pesticides under
FIFRA'6 ' without difficulty, and the statute should be able to address
rDNA microbial pesticides without significant problems. The proposed
regulation of rDNA deliberate releases under TSCA, on the other hand,
presents several problems. Although the legislative history indicates that
Congress intended TSCA to serve as a "gap filler" for other environmen-
tal laws, 162 so that applying it to biotechnology would not contravene
Congress' general purposes, there is no evidence that Congress ever con-
sidered the possibility that the statute would regulate biotechnology.
163
The technology was still in its infancy during this period,6 4 and it is un-
clear whether Congress intended TSCA's gap-filling role to encompass
only existing gaps, or also to include gaps that might arise in the future.
Because the legislative history does not address biotechnology, a court
deciding whether TSCA can be used to regulate biotechnology must make
its determination on the basis of other factors. A threshold question is
whether TSCA's "chemical substance" definition"6 5 can be read to cover
rDNA microbes. The regulation of nucleic sequences is uncontested under
the definition, but the EPA's plans to extend its regulatory powers to the
living microbes that contain these nucleic sequences have caused some
controversy.1
66
The arguments for applying TSCA to living rDNA microbes rely on the
literal terms of the chemical substance definition and on the general pur-
pose of TSCA. Living organisms are clearly "a combination of [organic]
substances occurring in whole or in part as a result of a chemical reaction
or occurring in nature," as TSCA's definition of chemical substance re-
quires. 6 7 The definition also requires, however, that a chemical substance
be "of a particular molecular identity.116  Living organisms are not of a
particular molecular identity; in fact, their exact chemical composition is
"' See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,320.
, See, e.g., Staff Report, supra note 22, at 11. The legislation may have been intended,
however, to fill contemporary, rather than future gaps.
113 See House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 7 (statement of
Rep. Dingell (D-Mich.)).
164 The NIH Guidelines were not completed until July, 1976.
15 See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
16 See Sun, EPA Revs Up to Regulate Biotechnology, 222 Sci. 823, 823 (1983) (quoting
EPA official for the proposition that "[c]ompanies have already promised that they'll sue
me" if authority is asserted under TSCA); see also Staff Report, supra note 22, at 123-26,
143-45 (concluding that although the arguments against applying TSCA are supportable,
the arguments in favor of regulatory authority are stronger).
167 See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(A) (1982).
"' See id.
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constantly changing, through respiration and other processes. 169 For this
reason, scientists have argued that living organisms are not chemical sub-
stances within the definition of TSCA. In the opinion of EPA Associate
General Counsel Stanley H. Abramson, "commonly accepted scientific
definitions [of chemical substances] both at the time of TSCA's enact-
ment and today do not [include life forms]."'170
Statements made by EPA officials just after passage of TSCA indicate
that the EPA itself had some reservations about classifying life forms as
chemical substances. As an EPA official stated in a 1977 letter to the
chairman of a Senate subcommittee:
[A]lthough there is a general consensus that recombinant DNA
molecules are "chemical substances" within the meaning of section
3 of TSCA, it is not at all clear whether a host organism containing
recombined DNA molecules fits-or was intended to fit-that defi-
nition .... If such organisms are subject to TSCA on the grounds
that they are a "combination of ... substances occurring in whole
or in part as a result of a chemical reaction," the Agency might
logically have to include all living things in the definition of
"chemical substance"-an interpretation which I am confident the
Congress neither contemplated nor intended.'
1
7
On the other hand, the EPA shortly thereafter rejected a comment sug-
gesting that bacteria and fungi were not chemical substance with the
statement that the chemical substances definition "does not exclude life
forms which may be manufactured for commercial purposes and nothing




Another argument supporting the regulation of living organisms under
TSCA is the all-inclusive nature of the statute's chemical substance defi-
nition. Because the definitional exclusions are made by explicit reference
to other federal laws,'1  it can be argued that Congress would have explic-
itly excluded life forms if it had so intended. 174 In addition, there is at
16" See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 32 (statement of
Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Programs, Office of Technology
Assessment) (recognizing that "it is arguable whether a living organism has a particular
moleculer [sic] identity").
170 Staff Report, supra note 22, at 145 (memorandum of Stanley H. Abramson, Associate
General Counsel, Pesticides and Toxic Substances Div., EPA) (arguing for TSCA
applicability).
1I Senate Oversight Report, supra note 40, at 88 (letter of Dec. 9, 1977, from Douglas M.
Costle, Administrator, EPA, to Sen. Adlai Stevenson, Chairman of Subcomm. on Science,
Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation).
172 Karny, gupra note 147, at 847-48 (citing 42 Fed. Reg. 64,572, 64,584 (1977)).
'" See 15 U.S.C. § 2602(2)(B) (1982).
174 This broad interpretation of TSCA's chemical substance definition is supported by the
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least one administrative precedent (predating the current attempts to
regulate biotechnology) for applying TSCA to living organisms: sub-
stances labeled as of unknown or variable composition, complex reaction
products, or biological materials-among which are included bacteria,
fungi, yeasts, and microorganisms-are listed on the TSCA Chemical
Substances Inventory. 17 5 In fact, the original Inventory instructions ex-
pressly required the reporting of bacteria, yeast, and fungi.1
7
1
Other elements of TSCA, however, support a determination that it is
not applicable to biotechnology. TSCA refers to the "manufacture" of
chemical substances,1 7 and bioengineered life forms are not manufac-
tured from whole cloth, though they may be altered. Similarly, the ex-
emption for small quantities used in research and development indicates
that Congress did not believe living microbes were covered by TSCA, be-
cause even small quantities of living organisms can create substantial en-
vironmental and human health problems when they multiply.'7 8 The
threat of such microbial reproduction has led the EPA to exclude all
rDNA deliberate release experiments from the TSCA exemption for small
quantities, by issuing a rule that defines small quantities of deliberate
release microbes as none whatsoever.
1 7 9
Many questions exist concerning the applicability of TSCA to living
organisms. These questions will almost certainly lead to court challenges
of the EPA's proposed inclusion of living organisms in TSCA, 80 causing
delays that will impede the development of the commercial biotechnology
industry. Yet even if the proposed application of TSCA to living orga-
nisms withstands court scrutiny, as seems likely, other problems will sur-
face. AGS's unauthorized testing of the ice-minus bacteria illustrates the
private sector's impatience with regulatory and judicial delays. But it also
points to a second flaw in the present regulatory system: the system does
Supreme Court's opinion in Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980). In Chakrabarty,
the Court held that a genetically engineered bacterium constituted a "manufacture" or
"composition of matter" within the meaning of the federal patent statute, id. at 308-18,
despite the fact that genetic technology was unforeseen at the time that statute was enacted,
id. at 314-18. The Chakrabarty analogy was first suggested by Rep. Gore in the House
Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 32.
178 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 125-26. Administrative precedents may be useful in
construing a statute. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
7' See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 125-26.
177 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2604(a) (1982).
178 See supra notes 29-37 and accompanying text (discussing potential hazards of micro-
bial release).
1' See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,330; supra notes 139-40 and
accompanying text.
180 See Sun, supra note 166, at 823.
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not provide regulators with sufficient information on the risks posed by
genetically engineered microbes.
B. Inadequate Data Accumulation and Evaluation
1. The Weakness of TSCA
The most important weakness of TSCA stems from the fact that it is
not a "permitting" statute-a manufacturer of a new chemical substance
need not secure a permit or a license before beginning production, so long
as he submits a PMN report.'8 ' The PMN must contain a "full report" of
any test data about the substance's health and environmental effects in
the manufacturer's possession or control.182 But there is no requirement
that the manufacturer develop these data before submitting the PMN,
and a PMN lacking the information is considered complete so long as the
manufacturer is not in possession or control of any such data.183 After the
PMN has been submitted, the EPA can require the manufacturer to con-
duct any testing reasonably necessary to develop these data, if it finds the
PMN itself insufficient to enable it to predict the health and environ-
mental effects. 84 But the EPA must first determine that the substance
may present an unreasonable risk of injury to health or the environ-
ment,18 5 or that it will be produced in substaiitial quantities and either
enter the environment in substantial quantities or result in substantial
human exposure. 88 Thus, the burden of demonstrating that more data
are required is on the EPA, not the manufacturer. Under such a regime,
181 See Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 126 (testimony
of Prof. Thomas 0. McGarity, Univ. of Texas Law School). FIFRA, on the other hand, is a
permitting statute-that is, it forbids a manufacturer of a new pesticide to proceed with its
sale or distribution until the new pesticide is properly registered. See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a)
(1982).
1'2 See 40 C.F.R. § 720.50(a)(3) (1986). By definition, this report should include "experi-
mental methods and materials, results, discussion and data analysis, conclusions, references,
and the name and address of the laboratory that developed the data." Id. However, these
items need only be included if they are in the PMN submitter's possession or control. See
id.
18'3 See id. For a description of this section, see 48 Fed. Reg. 41,132, 41,135 (Sept. 13,
1983) ("the absence of this information in the report submitted with the PMN will not
make the PMN incomplete, because it is not in the submitter's possession or control").
18 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1982).
381 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(A)(i) (1982).
38 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(1)(B)(i) (1982). If the EPA can make this showing, it can
enjoin the manufacture or use of the substance pending completion of the testing. See id. §
2604(e)(1)(A) (1982). See generally Note, The EPA and Biotechnology Regulation: Coping
with Scientific Uncertainty, 95 Yale L.J. 553, 564-65 (1986) (describing the data require-
ments of TSCA's PMN provisions).
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manufacturers have little incentive to develop data on the risks of new
rDNA products.
This apportionment of the burden is problematic, because the EPA
may have insufficient data to determine whether more data are necessary
to fully evaluate the risks of the new substance. The EPA may only de-
mand more information, however, where it can establish, on the basis of
the data submitted with the PMN, that an unreasonable risk exists or a
substantial exposure will occur.'8 7 Moreover, the EPA must make this de-
termination under substantial time pressure-if it fails to act within
ninety days (extendable to 180 days) of the PMN's submission, the sub-
mitter may begin to produce the unevaluated substance. 88 Given these
problems, the agency may fail to recognize the need to obtain additional
data in many cases.' 88 This is particularly likely to occur in the case of
rDNA products, where the potential risks of a substance are far from ob-
vious and the underlying biochemistry of genetic recombination is only
partially understood.' 90
187 See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
18 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,328; Note, supra note 186, at
565.
"' The question remains whether the EPA has the expert staff and sufficient funding to
adequately regulate biotechnology in general and deliberate releases in particular. The EPA
Office of Pesticide Programs administers FIFRA and has regulated microbial pesticides in
the past. See 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,883; see also House Hear-
ing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 47 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny,
Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology Assessment) (report-
ing that the office administering FIFRA, the OPP, is "sophisticated" in its approach to
evaluating the ecological impacts of genetically modified organisms). The Office of Toxic
Substances, which administers TSCA, has less experience with microbial substances, cf.
1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,326 (biotechnology companies are not
yet submitting under TSCA), and a 1980 Government Accounting Office study revealed that
the toxic substances program was understaffed. See House Hearing on Environmental Im-
plications, supra note 27, at 33 (statement of Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological
Applications Program, Office of Technology Assessment). More recently, the EPA Office of
Research and Development, which is responsible for developing many of the risk assessment
techniques necessary to evaluate deliberate releases, has undergone massive budget cuts,
prompting one congressman to remark that "there have been serious, damaging effects on
the availability and quality of scientific information caused by inadequate public investment
in ecological research." House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 9
(statement of Rep. Gerry Sikorski, D-Minn.).
190 The 1986 Microbial Product Policy indicates that manufacturers planning environ-
mental releases of regulated microbes "should assume, in the absence of data to the con-
trary, that the microorganisms may present a risk because of their potential to reproduce
and exhibit new traits. Therefore, EPA will expect manufacturers to provide test and other
data demonstrating the microorganisms' safety." 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note
92, at 23,327. It appears from this language that the EPA is attempting to make an across-
the-board finding that rDNA releases present an unreasonable risk sufficient to trigger the
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The most pressing question concerning TSCA and FIFRA is whether
the statutes will enable the EPA to gather enough data to make rational
decisions about the safety of deliberate releases. An earlier version of the
Microbial Product Policy acknowledged that "our current data require-
ments would yield no information about the characteristics that the in-
serted genes are intended to express, and the potential for other charac-
teristics to be unknowingly inserted and expressed."'' Although the 1986
Microbial Product Policy states that the EPA "is likely to require" data
on the new characteristics that the inserted genetic material is intended
to express, manufacturers are not required to submit data bearing on the
likelihood that it will actually express unknown characteristics, other
than a general requirement of information on "[m]ethods used to manip-
ulate source organisms." 92 Perhaps the most important data are those
that indicate the impact of the released microbe on the environment. The
effectiveness of TSCA and FIFRA in accumulating sufficient data on this
issue in turn depends on the techniques used to predict the environmen-
tal impact of released microbes.
2. The Limits of Modern Risk Assessment Techniques: The Nuclear
Power Example
Although there have been no reported injuries to human health or the
environment arising from laboratory research or field testing of rDNA mi-
crobes, 93 the potential for harm presented by such organisms has led the
staff of a House committee to conclude that assessment of the risks posed
by their deliberate release is "essential.'19 4 Yet the lack of injuries pro-
duced by laboratory research on rDNA microbes may not be an accurate
indication of these risks, because microbes designed for release may be
able to survive in environments where escaped laboratory organisms
would die. 95 Nor can regulators be certain that the lack of injuries from
field tests of deliberate release microbes fairly reflects the risks presented
right to demand extra testing. This would shift the burden of developing data regarding
health and environmental risks to the manufacturer, a result that seems to contradict the
current statutory scheme. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
191 1984 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 50,884.
'92 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,327.
191 See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 38 (statement of
Geoffrey M. Karny, Senior Analyst, Biological Applications Program, Office of Technology
Assessment).
'" See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 1.
195 See Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 115 (testimony
of Prof. Thomas 0. McGarity, Univ. of Texas Law School).
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by their commercial release, for commercial releases will undoubtedly oc-
cur at levels substantially greater than the field tests.""
To assess the potential hazards of deliberate release, scientists must
develop the capacity to predict the impact that both field tests and large-
scale commercial releases will have on the environment. This task, some-
times termed "predictive ecology,"'19 7 attempts to forecast the changes in
an environment caused by a single modification, such asthe introduction
of a particular rDNA microbe. Yet current risk assessment techniques
make it "extremely difficult, if not impossible" to accurately predict the
probability, magnitude, or type of impact a particular rDNA microbe will
have on the environment.9 8 The principal reasons for this inability to
assess the risks of deliberate release are the lack of a standard ecological
methodology for evaluating the environmental consequences of rDNA or-
ganisms and the lack of a sound data base from which to extract princi-
ples useful in predicting future events. 99 Without an effective methodol-
ogy in place, ready to catalog and analyze the effects of various deliberate
releases, field testing will not significantly enhance regulators' ability to
assess future risks.200 And without a reliable data base, even the most
sophisticated methodology will not enable regulators to make accurate
predictions about the impact of future releases.
20 1
In short, predictive ecology is an inexact science that falls short when
asked to determine the environmental consequences of deliberately re-
leased rDNA microbes.202 But the risks posed by these releases, which
"' See id. at 66-67 (testimony of Dr. Martin Alexander, Cornell University) (comparing
deliberate release to the regulation of pesticides where small quantities posed no threat to
ecological systems, but large-scale commercial use did cause problems).
17 See id. at 151 (testimony of Jack Doyle, Director, Agricultural Resources Project, En-
vironmental Policy Institute) (describing the field that attempts to determine the environ-
mental fate of organisms as "'predictive ecology' ").
19 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 20. This conclusion was based on the testimony of
several ecologists and is supported by the testimony of ecologists at other congressional
hearings. See generally House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27 (as-
sessing present knowledge of the ecological impact of biotechnology and deliberate releases
as well as suggestions for regulatory change).
1" See House Hearing on Environmental Implications, supra note 27, at 20 (statement of
Dr. Frances E. Sharples, Oak Ridge National Laboratory).
200 See House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 35 (statement of
Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich.) (stressing the need for research to ensure better predictions);
Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 117, 123 (testimony of
Prof. Thomas 0. McGarity, Univ. of Texas Law School) (recognizing the need for a central
data-gathering mechanism and proposing formation of a "central registry of hosts, vectors,
industrially useful genetic sequences, products, and byproducts").
201 See Weinberg, Science and Its Limits: The Regulator's Dilemma, Issues in Sci. &
Tech., Fall 1985, at 59, 63.
"' See Senate Hearings on Environmental Consequences, supra note 1, at 151 (testimony
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may be termed "low probability/high consequence" risks,20 1 present great
challenges for modern risk assessors. Evaluation of hazards with a small
chance of occurrence and a high degree of complexity is always difficult;
as physicist A.M. Weinberg has suggested, risk assessment in these areas
is more "trans-science" than science.20 4 In fact, Weisberg suggests that
the assessment of low probability/high consequence risks involves little
more than a political judgment.
20 5
Although the decision to permit a deliberate release may ultimately be
political, by accumulating a sound data base of analogous experiences,
regulators can assure that this political judgment is guided by the most
accurate predictions possible within the intrinsic limits of modern risk
assessment techniques. This data base must, however, preserve past ex-
periences in a form that will enable regulators to use them to predict fu-
ture events. As the nuclear power experience demonstrates, simply gath-
ering large quantities of data is not enough.
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) regulates an industry
presenting the same sort of low probability/high consequence risks as bio-
technology. 20 6 The NRC has created safety data requirements similar to
those used by the EPA under the current scheme-that is, requirements
that focus on situation-specific data not easily transferred to similar inci-
dents arising in the future.20 7 Although the NRC often received sufficient
quantities of data, a 1979 Government Accounting Office (GAO) study
found that it did not define clearly the scope or format of the information
required,20 but instead allowed each of its three headquarters offices and
five regional offices to determine individually the reporting requirements
for nuclear safety data.209 Moreover, the lack of uniformity in the data
of Jack Doyle, Director, Agricultural Resources Project, Environmental Policy Institute)
(stating that "we especially lack a predictive ecology in microbiology"); Note, supra note
186, at 558.
202 See Staff Report, supra note 22, at 9. The risks of deliberate release are termed "low
probability/high consequence" because, while few rDNA microbes will actually harm human
health or the environment, those that do may cause large-scale damage.
204 Weinberg, supra note 201, at 61.
205 Id. at 68.
2'0 See generally N. Evans & C. Hope, Nuclear Power: Futures, Costs and Benefits (1984)
(exploring the present state of nuclear power technology in the Western world and project-
ing its future).
207 Cf. House Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 18-19, 30 (state-
ment of Dr. Frank E. Young, Commissioner, Food and Drug Administration) (defending this
approach).
208 See Energy and Minerals Div., Government Accounting Office, Reporting Un-
scheduled Events at Commercial Nuclear Facilities: Opportunities to Improve Nuclear Reg-
ulatory Commission Oversight 4 (1979) (recommending that the NRC define the scope of
data gathered).
209 See id. at 3-5.
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generated by the disparate reporting measures made it difficult for regu-
lators to determine the relevance of one event to another,2 1 0 which made
it difficult to identify general principles useful in estimating future risks.
The GAO study demonstrated the need for systematic data collection
and assessment in the nuclear power industry. In the federal govern-
ment's current scheme for regulating biotechnology, the weakened BSCC
cannot prevent the agencies involved from committing the same mis-
take.2" Under the current regulatory framework, for example, the NIH
may develop data collection and assessment procedures inconsistent with
those of the EPA, limiting the federal government's ability to make accu-
rate risk assessments.
21 2
Simply stated, the nuclear power example demonstrates that where risk
data are not uniform, the usefulness of the data base to the industry as a
whole is diminished. Because the BSCC lacks the authority to require
uniform data collection, the current biotechnology regulatory scheme will
not benefit from the nuclear industry's experience and will not promote
accurate risk assessment as expeditiously as possible.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
The analysis of the federal government's attempts to regulate rDNA
deliberate releases demonstrates four fundamental weaknesses in the reg-
ulatory scheme. First, the scheme has not reduced the confusion over
agency jurisdiction.2 " The BSCC lacks the authority to settle jurisdic-
tional questions and to compel agencies to coordinate activities such as
the accumulation of data in a consistent form.
Second, applying TSCA to biotechnology without amending its provi-
sions creates difficulties. The questionable application of the TSCA
chemical substance definition to living organisms will result in further lit-
210 See id. at 19. Data from nuclear reactors also are inferior because the various designs
of nuclear power plants in the United States do not produce consistent, comparable safety
information. See Webb, The Accident Hazards of Nuclear Power Plants 65 (1976) (describ-
ing the negative effect of different plant designs on the ability to assess the possibility of
meltdowns).
"' One of the primary missions of the Working Group was to ensure that the various
agencies involved developed consistent approaches to the biotechnology problem. See House
Hearing on Biotechnology Regulation, supra note 17, at 11 (statement of Dr. Bernadine
Bulkley, Deputy Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Executive Office of the
President).
212 Although under the current scheme the two agencies may cooperate, the likelihood
that they will do so more frequently than the different offices within the NRC is slim.
211 Cf. OECD Committee Reaches Accord on Document for Achieving Uniform Approach
to Regulation, 9 Chem. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1094, 1094 (Dec. 13, 1985) (noting "'growing turf
battles about who will regulate biotechnology in the U.S.' ").
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igation, delays, and uncertainty in the regulated industry." 4
Third, although risk assessment is admittedly difficult in low
probability/high consequence fields, regulation under TSCA and FIFRA
may fail to produce the data necessary to evaluate individual experiments
or to increase the effectiveness of future risk assessment.1 5 TSCA now
places the burden on the already understaffed EPA to demonstrate that
substances pose unreasonable risks before additional data may be re-
quired. But the scientific debate over the risks of rDNA technology con-
strains the agency's ability to determine whether unreasonable risks exist,
thereby limiting its ability to demand additional information." More-
over, the voluntary TSCA requirements for data submission prevent the
EPA from requiring that data be developed in a consistent fashion. As a
result, data developed for the EPA may be subject to the same lack of
uniformity that may occur on the interagency level, where the BSCC
lacks the power to compel consistent data gathering. As experience in the
nuclear power area indicates, large amounts of data are most valuable
when they add to a common, assessable base of experience. Disparate or
inconsistent data are much less valuable to risk assessors.
Finally, the regulatory scheme will not accommodate the speed at
which the field of biotechnology advances. The advances will include not
only new techniques for genetic recombinatiorl, but also advances in un-
derstanding the fundamental processes that underlie biotechnology. For
example, researchers only recently learned the frequency with which dif-
ferent species of organisms may exchange genes in nature.2117 The implica-
tions of this finding for biotechnology are immense. Because the addition
of a harmful gene from another organism can render a seemingly innocu-
ous microbe dangerous, regulators must now examine the likelihood that
such exchange will occur when assessing the impact of a particular delib-
erate release.
The problems with the current regulatory scheme require both short-
term and long-term responses. The first three problems-jurisdictional
confusion, uncertainty about the application of TSCA to biotechnology,
214 Rifkin and Foundation for Economic Trends have tried to enjoin the 1986 Coordi-
nated Framework. See Bennett, Government's New Biotechnology Guidelines Leave Some
Issues Unresolved, 6 Genetic Engineering News, Sept. 1986, at 4, 10.
215 Nor can NEPA serve as a safety net for the potential inadequacies of TSCA and
FIFRA. NEPA requirements are satisfied by TSCA, see Twitty v. North Carolina, 527 F.
Supp. 778, 781 (E.D.N.C. 1979), aff'd, 696 F.2d 992 (4th Cir. 1982), and FIFRA, see Envi-
ronmental Defense Fund v. Blum, 458 F. Supp. 650, 661-62 (D.D.C. 1978).
210 Particularly important is information regarding the potential for exchange of genetic
material and the environmental fate of the organism.
217 See K. Low & D. Porter, Modes of Gene Transfer and Recombination in Bacteria, in
12 Annual Review of Genetics 249-87 (1978).
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and inadequate data requirements-call for immediate actions before the
EPA approves further deliberate releases. The fourth prob-
lem-regulating a field in which both the technological processes and the
underlying science are changing rapidly-should be addressed through
long-term structural modifications.
A. Immediate Actions: Clarification of Agency Jurisdiction and
Statutory Authority and Modification of Data Requirements
In the short term, with the impetus of international competition spur-
ring federal policymakers to promote the domestic biotechnology indus-
try,21 8 a coherent regulatory scheme is essential to ensure that human
health and the environment are protected. Clarification of agency juris-
diction and statutory authority will provide a degree of certainty to guide
biotechnology industry actions, reduce duplicative agency efforts, close
regulatory gaps, and produce more cost-effective regulation.
As a first step toward regulatory clarification, the Cabinet Council
Working Group should strengthen and expand the authority of the
BSCC, to enable it to untangle current and future jurisdictional disputes.
Like the advisory mechanism first proposed in the 1984 Coordinated
Framework,219 the BSCC should focus much of its effort on clarifying
agency authority. The strengthened BSCC should require that agencies
gather and share data developed on the characteristics of DNA sequences
in a consistent manner. This information should comprise a central data
bank for risk assessment, to provide regulators with a functional base of
information about rDNA research and specifically about the potential en-
vironmental effects of deliberately released rDNA microbes.
Second, Congress should amend TSCA to make clear that it applies to
rDNA microbes. Congress is now considering two bills,220 each of which
attempts to improve the regulatory response to the biotechnology prob-
lem. The Senate bill, 221 cast in the form of an amendment to TSCA, is the
superior medicine for biotechnology's regulatory ills, because it converts
TSCA into a permitting statute for the purposes of rDNA regulation,22
places the burden of demonstrating that a particular rDNA microorga-
nism "will not cause an adverse effect on human health or the environ-
ment" on the producer, 22' and defines microbes subject to TSCA regula-
2S See 1986 Coordinated Framework, supra note 92, at 23,308.
219 See 1984 Coordinated Framework, supra note 92, at 50,856-58.
220 See supra note 142.
22' S. 1967, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 Cong. Rec. 17,812-14 (1985) [hereinafter Senate
Bill].
222 See id. § 32(a)(2), 131 Cong. Rec. at 17,812.
23 Id. § 32(a)(4), 131 Cong. Rec. at 17,813.
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tion in a broad fashion22 4 that is consistent with the definition adopted by
the EPA in the Microbial Product Policy.2 25 Another positive feature of
the Senate bill is its reformulation of the standard the EPA Administra-
tor must satisfy before requiring a producer to provide more information.
Whereas TSCA currently permits the Administrator to demand more in-
formation from a producer only upon a finding that the microbe "may
reasonably" be harmful,228 the Senate measure would authorize him to do
so simply upon a determination that such information is "necessary.
'227
Although the House bill also converts TSCA into a permitting statute,
it would eliminate the concurrent regulation of genetically engineered mi-
crobes under FIFRA.22 s Because FIFRA's current data requirements are
closer to what is necessary to permit adequate assessment of the risks of
rDNA microbial pesticides,229 the Senate bill, which preserves the option
of regulation under FIFRA, s0 is preferable.
Nor is the House bill's definition of the genetically engineered microbes
that are subject to TSCA regulation satisfactory. The bill defines "'ge-
netically-engineered organism'" as "a bacterium, virus, fungus, plant cell,
plant tissue, animal cell, or animal tissue which has been deliberately al-
tered to contain genetic material derived from more than one taxonomic
genus."128' Predicating regulatory jurisdiction upon generic classifications
may lead to unjustified loopholes in review, in which "intra-generi" 232
microorganisms escape regulation, although they may not necessarily pose
fewer risks than inter-generic microbes. The definition offered in the Sen-
ate bill, which focuses on whether an organism's genetic structure has
been altered by human intervention, rather than on whether it contains
material from organisms of different genera, is far more useful.
Both the House and Senate measures take steps in the right direction
114 The Senate bill provides that "the term 'genetically engineered micro-organism' means
a bacterium, virus, fungus, blue-green alga, or protist, the genetic material of which has
deliberately been altered by human intervention." Id. § 32(i), 131 Cong. Rec. at 17,813.
21 See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,316.
22 See 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a) (1982).
127 See Senate Bill, supra note 221, § 32(e)(1)-(2), 131 Cong. Rec. at 17,813. One problem
area in biotechnology regulation, the weakness of the BSCC, is left untouched by the Senate
bill, which merely provides for the composition of BSCC membership, the announcement of
meetings, and the status of meetings as either open or in some cases closed. See id. § 32(j),
131 Cong. Rec. at 17,813-14.
:13 H.R. 4452, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., § 505 (1986) [hereinafter House Bill].
2 See supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text.
"0 See Senate Bill, supra note 221, § 32(g), 131 Cong. Rec. at 17,813.
21 House Bill, supra note 228, § 301(b).
2 Intra-generic rDNA microbes are produced by the transfer of genetic material between
two organisms of the same genus. See 1986 Microbial Product Policy, supra note 92, at
23,326; supra note 127.
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by subjecting deliberate releases to permit requirements. 33 The measures
also resolve the controversial application of TSCA's chemical substance
definition to rDNA microorganisms by the addition of a specific provision
covering genetically engineered microorganisms. Most importantly, both
measures shift the burden of proving relative safety from the regulatory
agency to the producer.
23
Finally, regulators should apply to the deliberate release problem a les-
son learned from laboratory-bound rDNA research-the use of microbes
that have been genetically crippled to survive only in particular environ-
ments. Much of the success of laboratory rDNA safety is the result of the
use of microbes from which scientists have removed the gene for the pro-
duction of an essential enzyme.235 Because these microbes will survive
only in laboratory environments to which scientists have added amounts
of the missing enzyme, they die soon after they escape from the labora-
tory.2 s The use of microbes similarly designed to exist only in particular
environments would reduce the risks of deliberate release significantly.
133 See House Bill, supra note 228, § 301(a);. Senate Bill, supra note 221, § 32(a)(2), 131
Cong. Rec. at 17,812.
234 See House Bill, supra note 228, § 301(a); Senate Bill, supra note 221, § 32(a)(4), 131
Cong. Rec. at 17,813.
35 See Decision of the Director, National Institutes of Health to Release Guidelines for
Research on Recombinant DNA Molecules, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902, 27,904 (July 7, 1976) (not-
ing that "[bfiological containment is the use of vectors or hosts that are crippled by mutila-
tion so that the recombinant DNA is incapable of surviving under natural conditions").
234 See id. Similarly, federal regulations could require scientists to remove the gene for an
essential compound from field-tested rDNA microbes whenever possible. Carefully designed
microbes would survive only if the investigator applied the missing compound to the mi-
crobes in the field. For example, the EPA could have required that the AGS investigators
remove the gene for the production of a metabolite from the ice-minus bacterium. Then,
when the bacterium was applied to the strawberry plants as proposed, the metabolite could
be sprayed onto the plants in the field. The microbes would survive with the added com-
pound, but if they began to have an adverse environmental impact the investigators could
control them by halting application of the missing compound.
The advantages of this biological containment mechanism are that investigators can field
test rDNA microbes with relative safety, even where predictive ecology is unable to deter-
mine the probable environmental fate of the microbe. Although the self-destructor mecha-
nism will require some additional expense at the experimental stage, much of the expense
will be compensated by savings on additional greenhouse and laboratory simulations that
investigators might have to perform without the mechanism. If the microbe proves to be
safe in field tests, scientists could reinsert the missing gene at the commercial production
stage. Alternatively, the EPA could require commercially produced rDNA microbes to lack
the ability to produce a compound so that the safety mechanism will operate in large-scale
microbial applications as well as field tests.
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B. Long-Term Response: Adapting the EPA to Biotechnology
Regulation
A recurring problem with the EPA's regulation of biotechnology is the
complex nature of the biological issues involved. To be effective, regula-
tors must be well versed in the current understanding of fundamental
biological concepts, as well as in biotechnological processes. A thorough
and current understanding of scientific issues is also necessary if the EPA
is to retain the respect and full cooperation of the regulated industry,
which is composed of highly trained scientists equipped with the most
advanced instruments. Regulators who are scientists themselves can en-
sure that the EPA receives the data necessary to evaluate adequately the
risks of rDNA technology.
2 7
The use of scientist-regulators would also permit more efficient data
collection. Industries that produce biotechnological products can generate
data about those products more efficiently than can independent consul-
tants or agency scientists.2 3 8 Yet fear of manipulated or incomplete stud-
ies makes federal regulators reluctant to rely on industry-generated
data. 39 Regulators who maintained active research programs in the same
general field as the regulated industry, however, would be able to spot
faulty or incomplete industry data.
The Division of Biochemistry and Biophysics of the Center for Drugs
and Biologics of the Food and Drug Administration (the Center) provides
an excellent a model for the regulatory oversight of a rapidly evolving
field like biotechnology. The Center employs over 300 scientists who
spend the majority of their time on basic rDNA research and their re-
maining time on regulatory assignments for the Center.2 0 Because the
Center provides so much time for basic research, the program attracts
eminent scientists with active research programs. These scientist-regula-
tors have gained the respect of their peers in the biotechnology industry.
In fact, one government official asserts that scientists with knowledge of
the subject matter are able to perform as much regulatory oversight .in
twenty percent of their time as less informed regulators can working on a
full-time basis.
24 1
237 An immediate problem that must be studied is agency capture. See, e.g., Dworkin,
supra note 157, at 231. This problem could be addressed in part by disallowing any consult-
ing on the part of agency scientists.
238 See Kates, Success, Strain, and Surprise, Issues in Sci. & Tech., Fall 1985, at 46, 53.
239 See id. at 54 (suggesting that an agency guarantee of confidentiality of test data may
be appropriate).
110 Telephone interview with Dale Wilburn, Acting Division Director, Department of Ad-
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The Center's scientist-regulators provide the FDA with the benefits of
efficiency, accurate regulatory supervision, and basic research. The EPA
could use scientist-regulators in a similar fashion to improve its biotech-
nology regulatory strategy. By properly channeling industry research at
an early stage, scientist-regulators could instruct biotechnology compa-
nies in efficient compliance with applicable regulations. Scientist-regula-
tors could also supervise the production of safety data by the industry
itself. With industry-submitted data subject to review by practicing scien-
tists, regulatory supervision would be more accurate. Finally, the research
generated by scientist-regulators would, of course, be of continuing value
to society.
Although the EPA calls on research scientists in the final stages of its
deliberate release review, 242 the success of the Center's scientist-regula-
tors demonstrates the advantages of incorporating research scientists
throughout the entire regulatory process. The EPA should evaluate the
applicability of the Center's scientist-regulator program to its regulation
of biotechnology generally and to deliberate releases in particular.
V. CONCLUSION
The biotechnology industry is a rapidly developing and highly competi-
tive industry that has the potential to produce great benefits. Unfortu-
nately, deliberate releases of rDNA microbes present significant risks as
well. These low probability/high consequence risks differ from the risks
presented by laboratory-based biotechnology and are difficult to evaluate
with modern risk assessment techniques. As a result, the long experience
of safety with laboratory rDNA research may not be indicative of the po-
tential hazards of deliberate releases.
The current regulatory framework will not contribute to the improve-
ment of risk assessment techniques. The federal government's current co-
ordinating organization, the BSCC, lacks the authority to compel agencies
to develop a central data bank. Yet without such a central storehouse of
collective experience, assessment of the risks of rDNA research generally,
and deliberate release in particular, will remain difficult. In addition,
TSCA does not ensure that regulators will have enough information-or
enough time-to make the initial finding necessary to permit them to re-
quire the submission of more data about a particular rDNA microbe. The
EPA's attempts to graft biotechnology onto a statute primarily designed
to control inert pollutants will result in delaying litigation, prolonging the
uncertainty among biotechnology enterprises.
"' The EPA has provided for a Scientific Advisory Committee composed of research
scientists and others to advise the agency, modeled on the NIHRAC. See 1986 Microbial
Product Policy, supra note 92, at 23,318.
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The weaknesses in the federal regulatory structure can be addressed in
the short term by strengthening the BSCC to enable it to oversee the
development of a central data bank for rDNA research and deliberate
release information, and by congressional clarification of TSCA's applica-
bility to biotechnology. To ensure that regulators obtain sufficient data to
evaluate the risks of new rDNA microbes, the amended TSCA should
place a FIFRA-type burden on manufacturers to demonstrate the safety
of new organisms before proceeding with release experiments. In the long
term, the EPA should study the feasibility of fully incorporating research
scientists into the oversight of biotechnology. These actions will ensure
that the biotechnology industry will prosper and that the rutabaga that
eats Pittsburgh will not gain EPA approval.
Michael P. Vandenbergh
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